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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of results forecasts and exit polls in BBC general election night 
broadcasts from 1955 to 2017. Despite the substantial role played by academics in results 
programmes, in devising forecasts and analysing results as they emerge, academic literature 
on election night broadcasts is scant. This paper charts the development of election night 
forecasting over time and its implications for the structure and content of election night 
broadcasts. It draws on a unique new data set of verbatim transcripts of the first hour of 
every BBC election night broadcast from 1955-2017 to quantify the attention paid to 
forecasts and exit polls and assess how they frame discussion of the likely outcome and its 
potential political consequences. The paper concludes that the function of election night 
broadcasts as ‘the first draft of psephology’ merits closer attention for both the political 
narratives and the academic research agendas they generate.  
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Introduction 
 
Within the extensive international literature on elections, considerable attention has been 
paid to the role and influence of television coverage (Nimmo, 1970; Ansolabehere et al, 
1993; Semetko, 1996; Banducci and Karp, 2003), including the significance of specific 
televised campaign events, such as leaders’ debates (Blais and Perrella, 2008; Coleman, 
2000; Pattie and Johnston, 2011; Drake and Higgins, 2012). Understandably, the primary 
focus of such research has been on television content during campaigns, how it is consumed 
and employed by voters, and whether it shapes political opinions and, therefore, ultimately 
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influences vote choice (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007; Ansolabehere et al, 2011; Wring et al 
2017; Beckett 2016). In contrast, literature focussed on the final broadcast event of any 
election, the results programme itself, is far more limited. A small body of work on exit 
polling, which has become a core feature of election night broadcasts since the 1970s, 
provides a partial exception (for example, Brown and Payne, 1975; Levy, 1983; Brown and 
Payne, 1984; Traugott and Price, 1992; Bishop and Fisher, 1995; Curtice and Firth, 2008; 
Curtice et al., 2011). However, these accounts overwhelmingly focus on the technical issues 
associated with the design of exit polls and their accuracy, rather than on the part they play 
in relation to broadcasting coverage. The significance of election night broadcasts as events 
in themselves has received scant attention.  
 
On one level, election result programmes are designed with the simple purpose of 
conveying and explaining the results to the electors (Ross and Joslyn, 1988; Orr, 2015; 
Lauerbach, 2013). Yet, for those engaged in them, such broadcasts constitute a unique and 
complex broadcasting context, creating opportunities and risks that go beyond simple 
reporting of establishing which party proves victorious and why. On election night, political 
actors react to individual constituency results and to the emerging evidence of the overall 
performance of their own, and rival, parties. The narratives which emerge on election night 
can frame the legacy of an incumbent or outgoing government and provide, or diminish, 
political capital for parties and leaders immediately after the election (Mendelsohn, 1998; 
Cathcart, 1997; Hale, 1993). In addition to politicians, election night broadcasts typically 
involve journalists, academics and other commentators in a process of framing, shaping, 
contesting and reinforcing these narratives. Importantly, this process takes place in ‘real 
time’, in response to rolling information about outcomes in individual constituencies, before 
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any detailed analysis of the final national results or of post-election survey data is possible. 
Just as journalists provide ‘the first draft of history’, election night broadcasts can be seen to 
offer ‘the first draft of psephology’.  
 
This instant, televised analysis is likely to carry significant weight in how election outcomes 
are interpreted, particularly in the short-term. Explanations that emerge from election night 
broadcasts can become important points of departure for scholarship in the weeks and 
months that follow, sometimes becoming a focus of academic controversy. An example 
from the 2017 UK General Election provides a useful illustration. Early in the BBC election 
night broadcast, with just two constituency results declared, the BBC’s Political Editor, Laura 
Kuenssberg told lead presenter, David Dimbleby, that a view was emerging that higher 
turnout among younger voters was a key factor in Labour’s unexpectedly good 
performance. References to the role of younger, youth or student voters were repeated at 
regular intervals in the hours that followed, helping shape a view that a ‘Youthquake’ had 
taken place and was central to understanding the election outcome. Yet, this claim has 
subsequently become the source of significant academic controversy. Prosser et al (2018) 
drew on British Election Study data to describe the youthquake as a myth, while others 
responded to reassert the case that turnout among younger voters had increased (Sturgis 
and Jennings, 2019) and that the youth vote had made a significant and discernible 
difference (Stewart et al, 2018; Sloam and Henn, 2019).  
 
In this paper, we explore how the production of on-the-night results forecasts, a long-
standing focus of academic engagement in election nights, shapes the structure and content 
of television broadcasts. The first part of the paper summarises the limited available 
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literature on election night broadcasts and charts how election night forecasting methods 
for UK general elections have developed since the 1950s, particularly with respect to exit 
polling. In the second part of the paper we set out how we created an original new dataset, 
comprising verbatim transcripts of the first hour of every BBC election night broadcast from 
1955-2017, and how we coded and analysed the data to chart how changing approaches to 
forecasting relate to programme content over time. In the final part of the paper, we report 
our findings. We quantify the attention paid to forecasts and exit polls and assess how they 
frame discussion of the likely outcome, as well as some of potential consequences for those 
engaged in the broadcasts. We also document how live discussion of projections draws on 
the ‘legacy’ of past forecasts, which may be used by participants to express scepticism or 
support for their likely credibility. The paper concludes that the function of election night 
broadcasts as ‘the first draft of psephology’ merits closer attention, for both the political 
narratives and the academic research agendas they generate.  
 
Election night broadcasts and exit polling: an overview 
 
 
While election night broadcasts draw heavily on academic input, and are likely to shape 
scholarly debate, they have only rarely themselves been the subject of research. Indeed, in 
the case of the UK, only the iconic broadcast coverage of the 1997 General Election has 
received significant attention. Cathcart’s (1997) account of that election provides the most 
comprehensive analysis of UK election broadcast content, detailing the events of election 
night from 10pm through to 6am. However, as the blurb to his book underlines, Cathcart’s is 
a journalist’s account, aimed at “recapturing the mood of an astonishing night”, rather than 
scholarly analysis. The 1997 election is also the focus of Marriot’s (2000) account of the 
unique nature of election night broadcasts in connecting the ‘centre’, in the form of the BBC 
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studio, to the ‘periphery’ of a multiplicity of outside broadcast locations (such as election 
counts, party headquarters and party leaders’ homes). In a slightly different vein, Lauerbach 
(2007, 2017) evaluates, respectively, the purpose of UK election night broadcasts in 
comparative international perspective, as well as the manner in which losing candidates 
negotiate defeat in televised coverage, again using the case of 1997. Cathcart (1997) aside, 
these studies have tended to analyse relatively small sections of the broadcast, in one case 
restricted to a single interview, with Conservative candidate Michael Portillo (Lauerbach, 
2017). Marriot (2000) offers some comparisons with the 1992 election broadcast, but 
otherwise very little has been written about how election night programming has developed 
over time. The principal exception is provided by Crick’s (2018) biography of David Butler, 
which captures many details of how the BBC’s election night coverage evolved from 1950 to 
1979, albeit from the particular standpoint of Butler’s role in them. Consideration of 
election broadcasts beyond the BBC is also rare, although Glaister (2019) provides an 
account of Sky’s coverage of the 2017 General Election. 
 
The modest US literature on election night broadcasts exhibits differences of emphasis to 
that relating to UK elections. One longstanding US concern is whether the broadcasting of 
projections and outcomes influences turnout or candidate choices in close election results – 
a scenario that is only feasible in cases such as US presidential elections, where polls are still 
open in some states while results are being declared from others (Tuchman and Coffin, 
1971, Sudman, 1986). In light of the controversies generated by the premature calls made 
by television networks in their coverage of the 2000 presidential elections, Mitofsky and 
Edelman (2002) provide a comprehensive account of how exit polling takes place on 
election nights from the perspective of those conducting the analysis. A handful of studies 
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have used textual data, derived from broadcasts, to examine issues such as the role of myth 
and ritual in election night television (Ross and Joselyn, 1998) and whether the content of 
election night broadcasts has changed over time (Patterson, 2004). As with the UK 
literature, these isolated US studies restrict their analysis to one or two elections, although 
they also analyse broadcasts on the three principal networks: ABC, CBS and NBC. 
 
While the content of UK election night broadcasts has received limited academic attention, 
the methods used to produce results forecasts for them has been exceptionally well 
documented (Brown and Payne, 1975; Brown and Payne, 1984; Payne, 1992; Rallings and 
Thrasher, 1993; Brown et al., 1999; Payne, 2003; Curtice and Firth, 2008; Fisher et al., 2010; 
Curtice et al., 2011; Curtice et al., 2017). The sophisticated methods which have 
underpinned exit polling are detailed in full in this literature and are not our primary 
concern in this paper. Instead, we focus here on how exit polling evolved as an extension of 
early BBC attempts at election night forecasting and briefly explain how methodological 
innovations and technological advances have enabled researchers to respond to the 
considerable challenges of producing on-the-night forecasts.  
 
Election night forecasting has been a feature of BBC coverage of UK general elections since 
1950, when David Butler used the principle of uniform national swing (UNS) to project the 
national outcome based on a handful of initial constituency results (Crick, 2018). In practice, 
predicting the final outcome in this way took the form of a rolling forecast, which generally 
began some way wide of the mark but became increasingly accurate as more constituency 
results were declared. However, from the 1960s, the core forecasting assumption in the 
UNS model was increasingly undermined as increased geographical concentration of 
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support for the Conservatives and Labour, as well as the growth of support for other parties, 
rendered constituency swings more variable. 
 
The availability, from 1969 onwards, of Census data for parliamentary constituencies (based 
initially on the 1966 Sample Census) enabled the development of new approaches to 
election forecasting. For the 1970 General Election, an experimental approach was adopted 
of surveying voters as they left polling stations in a single ‘bellwether’ constituency, 
Gravesend in Kent, deemed to be most socio-demographically typical in Great Britain. The 
Gravesend survey was, in effect, a proto-exit poll and this approach was extended in 
February 1974, when three so called ‘straw polls’ were conducted in marginal 
constituencies, as people left polling stations. The 1974 elections saw a step-change in the 
statistical methods used, based on ridge regression and utilising a range of independent 
variables, including Census data (Brown and Payne, 1975). For the October 1974 election, a 
‘How did you vote?’ poll was carried out in 155 constituencies and used as the basis for a 
more sophisticated projection model devised by Clive Payne and others. For the first time, a 
full projection of the number of seats won by each party was presented prior to the first 
actual result being declared. The October 1974 forecast was to prove highly inaccurate, 
predicting a Labour majority of 135, compared to an actual Labour majority of just 3, with 
Brown and Payne (1975) suggesting that the model was badly skewed by the inclusion of a 
national opinion poll of questionable value. Nonetheless, Payne’s approach was repeated, 
with some refinements, at the 1979 General Election, when it correctly forecasted a 
Conservative majority. The same technique produced an almost perfect projection of the 
seats won by the three main parties in 1983 and thereafter became the established 
9 
 
forecasting method through to 2001 (Brown and Payne, 1984; Brown et al., 1999; Payne, 
2003). 
 
The term ‘exit poll’ was first used in the BBC’s 1992 election night programme (at which 
Payne and his colleagues failed to predict a Conservative majority) and has since become an 
established feature of election night, with broadcasts opening with exit poll predictions 
when polls close at 10pm. In 2005, Payne’s leadership of the exit poll operation passed to 
John Curtice and significant changes were again made to the methods used. From 2005, 
David Frith’s proposal was adopted that, rather than trying to derive constituency-level 
results from estimates of national votes shares, exit polling should focus on measuring 
changes in vote shares from the previous election in key constituencies. The 2005 General 
Election also saw BBC and ITV pool their resources (with the addition of Sky in 2010) 
commissioning a single exit poll and thereby enabling a much larger number of polling 
places to be sampled. In 2015 and 2017, the three broadcasters continued to commission 
the exit poll jointly. The record of the exit poll team in producing highly accurate estimates 
in 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2017, the latter three of which were elections with extremely close 
outcomes, has won widespread praise within and beyond academia.  
 
The significance of exit polls in shaping the experience of election night broadcasts, for both 
viewers and participants, is well captured by Curtice et al. (2017: 29): “(…) the exit poll 
forecast is watched by millions. It dominates the headlines until the actual outcome of the 
election becomes apparent a few hours later”. Both academics and broadcasters are acutely 
aware of the implications of the profile of exit polls and the manner in which they frame the 
most widely-watched initial hours of election night broadcasts. Exit polling methods have 
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long been subject to some of the most rigorous, open and combative peer review (see 
Brown and Payne 1975, for instance). When exit polls have proved remarkably accurate, 
notably in 1983, 2010, 2015 and 2017, their architects have always admitted that a degree 
of good fortune was involved. As those involved in producing them are keen to stress, exit 
polls for UK general elections pose particular methodological challenges. Under first-past-
the-post (FPTP), votes do not translate in a consistent way to seats, as they do under 
proportional representation. Projections become far more difficult when a larger share of 
the vote is taken by parties other than Labour or the Conservatives. Whatever the method, 
analysis has to be undertaken at great speed, increasing the risk of error. Nonetheless, 
where forecasts and exit polls have subsequently been interpreted as being some way wide 
of the mark, the academics involved in them have inevitably found themselves on the 
defensive, particularly at elections where pre-election polling also came to be seen as 
flawed (Payne, 1992; Rallings and Thrasher, 1993; Brown et al., 1999).  
 
This pattern gave rise to Payne’s (1992) law of election forecasting, which proposed that ‘a 
bad forecast is remembered forever, good ones are soon forgotten’. The 1992 exit poll, 
which initially projected the most likely outcome as a hung parliament with Labour as the 
largest party, cast a shadow over exit polls at subsequent elections, resulting in a tendency 
for politicians and commentators to be more sceptical in their reactions and for the BBC to 
be more cautious in its claims. This tendency was very much in evidence in 2010, when the 
projection of a fall in the number of Liberal Democrat seats was initially met with disbelief 
from several quarters. Once the remarkable accuracy of the 2010 exit poll became 
apparent, with a further surprise exit poll projection in 2015 also proving its detractors 
wrong, scepticism about the 2017 exit poll was clearly more muted.  As Curtice et al. (2017: 
11 
 
29) note with respect to the 2017 exit poll, “the forecast, even though surprising, was 
accepted as an initial basis for discussion of the expected outcome and its implications”.  
 
Data collections and methods. 
 
To examine how these developments in election night forecasting have interacted with the 
structure and content of BBC election night programming, we produced verbatim 
transcripts of the first hour of each broadcast from 1955 to 2017. No recording of the BBC 
broadcasts of the 1950 or 1951 General Election results has survived, meaning that 1955 is 
the earliest programme available (Crick, 2018). The textual data were initially generated 
through two principal methods, designed to generate transcripts as efficiently and cost-
effectively as possible. For the elections that took place from 1955-2010, the data were 
mined from user-uploaded YouTube videos of BBC coverage, from which YouTube 
automatically generated a transcript for each election (YouTube, 2018). For the 2015 and 
2017 elections, transcripts were available from ‘Box of Broadcasts’ and generated from the 
BBC’s own subtitles that accompanied the programmes.  
 
As with many studies that analyse text, the data generated were rich and extensive but 
needed considerable cleaning to produce reliable findings. The transcripts generated from 
YouTube contained missing sections of text, large numbers of inaccuracies in spelling or 
word identification and provided no differentiation between the speakers. These issues 
were expected, not least because of the poorer audio quality of the older broadcasts 
(YouTube 2018). Nonetheless, our experience was consistent with assessments that auto-
generation offers enormous scope to produce transcripts far more cheaply than manual 
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transcribing and with limited loss of quality (Novotney and Callison-Burch 2010). The auto-
generated transcripts provided the substantial base of text to work from, with small missing 
sections hand-transcribed from the broadcast recordings. The first hour of each transcript 
was then carefully cleaned by checking it against the broadcast to produce verbatim scripts 
in a consistent format. The initial 2015 and 2017 transcripts were of a better quality than 
those captured via YouTube but also required cleaning and formatting in a similar way. 
Limiting our study to the first hour of each election night transcript maintained the 
longitudinal design of our study, whilst keeping the exercise of cleaning the data 
manageable (even after restricting our focus to the first hour of each broadcast the 
transcripts amounted to a combined total of approximately 150,000 words).  
 
While our data are extensive and original, they also has some limitations. First, by reducing 
the broadcasts to written text, we exclude consideration of the visual elements of the 
broadcasts. The interplay between the visual and audio elements of the broadcasts is often 
evident in the transcripts, particularly with respect to the graphics used to communicate 
exit polls, forecasts and results. Nonetheless, we recognise that visual imagery provides a 
layer of ‘text’ that is absent from our analysis. Second, our transcripts relate only to BBC 
election night coverage, despite the airing of simultaneous broadcasts on ITV since 1959 and 
on Sky since 1992. Our sole focus on BBC coverage can be justified on several grounds, 
beyond the pragmatic consideration of keeping the task manageable. BBC coverage 
provides the longest possible timespan and, despite growing competition, has sustained its 
position as the most widely watched programme. Estimates for 2015 and 2017 suggest that 
the average audience for the duration of BBC1’s election night coverage was over 4 million, 
about 4 times that of ITV and more than 10 times that of Sky (The Guardian, 2015; Press 
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Gazette, 2017). Comparing rival broadcasts would enable fuller consideration of the 
narratives that emerge from election night, including from the competition between them - 
an issue that has repeatedly been highlighted in US studies (Bohn, 1980; Frankovic, 2003; 
Marriot, 2007). However, in the UK case, rivalry between the broadcasters to be the first to 
call an election has never been as intense as it is in the USA, as underlined by the recent 
practice of the three main UK broadcasters pooling their resources to produce a joint exit 
poll. The extent to which UK broadcasters vary in how they integrate exit polls into their 
programming, and the manner in which they do compete in their results coverage on 
election night, would certainly merit research, but is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
Having generated verbatim transcripts of the first hour of every BBC election night 
broadcast from 1955-2017, we undertook thematic analysis of the textual data to compare 
the role of forecasts and exit polls in election night coverage over time. In order to test a 
series of hypotheses relating to the role of exit polling in election night coverage, the 
transcripts were coded using the qualitative data analysis software, NVivo. Using NVivo 
enabled us to work collaboratively as researchers on the coding and analysis of the data and 
provided for efficient data management and analysis, which was invaluable given the 
volume of textual data employed. An initial coding structure was devised by examining a 
subset of four transcripts from different decades to develop a base framework of inductive 
codes that related specifically to our data. This initial coding structure was then revised, 
formalised and refined through an iterative process as each transcript was fully coded, 
including the addition of any election-specific codes. We coded our data simultaneously by 
descriptive, attitudinal and explanative codes, to provide a multileveled analysis (see 
Saldana, 2013). This facilitated the analysis of different groups of actors, such as contrasts 
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between Conservative and Labour politicians, or between journalists and academics. Once 
coding was complete, individual codes were abstracted into broader substantive themes 
that structure our findings (see Punch, 2014). The coding framework was particularly 
important in enabling us to use NVivo to quantify the overall attention paid to forecasts and 
exit polls and to capture what types of actor (e.g. journalist, politician, academic) took part 
in these discussions. As such, the software was invaluable in assisting us to summarise and 
visualise the data, a task that is frequently challenging in qualitative studies (Silverman, 
2014).  
 
Our analysis was guided by four hypotheses, or ‘testable propositions’, used to code and 
interrogate the data. These hypotheses were as follows: 
 
1. The development of exit polls from 1970 onwards will be associated with a 
progressive frontloading of election night broadcasts with discussion of the likely 
result and its consequences. We expect to see this trend for two reasons. First, in 
contrast to forecasts based on UNS, exit polls enable a predicted outcome to be 
broadcast before any results are available. Second, competitive pressures to capture 
and retain viewers early in the broadcast will strongly incentivise discussion of 
results forecasts.   
2. Where an exit poll predicts a close result, it will generate speculation early in the 
broadcast about potential governing arrangements, including the viability of a 
minority government, possible inter-party deals and coalitions. We derive this 
proposition from the observation that, as relatively rare occurrences in Westminster 
elections, the potential prospect of a ‘hung parliament’ can be expected to generate 
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speculation about outcomes other than the single-party majority governments that 
FPTP is expected to deliver. 
3. An exit poll that is surprising or confirms a tight race will result in more conditional 
analysis (‘if’ statements) than one that confirms a widely expected and clear 
outcome. We advance this hypothesis on the basis that journalists, politicians and 
commentators will instinctively be more cautious in how they react to an exit poll 
that predicts a close outcome or one that contradictions pre-election polling. We 
also expect briefings from the exit poll team to be more heavily caveated in these 
circumstances and for this to translate into direct advice to broadcasters to present 
the projections cautiously.  
4. Election night coverage will provide confirmation of Payne’s law of exit polling, as 
evidenced by a) analysis of the current exit poll to be more cautious and sceptical if 
preceding ones had ‘failed’; and b) ‘failed’ exit polls being mentioned far more than 
any other past exit poll. This final hypothesis simply represents an operationalisation 
of Payne’s law, outlined above, so that it can be tested using our data and methods. 
Results and discussion 
 
Our first hypothesis, that the development of exit polls has been associated with the 
frontloading of election night broadcasts with discussion of projections, is borne out by the 
data. Figure 1 charts the proportion of the first hour of each BBC election results broadcast 
since 1955 that has been devoted to discussing various forms of prediction and projection, 
as well as their potential consequences, for parties, leaders and government formation. In 
addition, each data point is colour-coded to indicate the relative accuracy of the forecast 
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made in that broadcast. We discuss the significance of the track record of the individual 
projections below in relation to hypothesis 4, since these are likely to explain why the 
tendency towards frontloading broadcasts with discussion of projections is not linear. 
 
The graph shows a very clear and substantial increase over time in the early attention to 
projections, albeit with some very notable fluctuations. From 1955-1966, the rolling 
forecasts made on the basis of initial results made up only a modest proportion of the first 
hour of the programme, since very few constituency results were declared at this early 
stage of the broadcast. By contrast, the early experiments with exit polling in the 1970 and 
the two 1974 general elections were presented and discussed in some detail, thereby 
resulting in a substantial increase in the time given over to discussing the predicted result, 
compared to previous broadcasts. The step change in the methods used for the October 
1974 election, and the BBC’s decision to present a full seat projection early in the broadcast 
resulted in almost one-third of the first hour of the coverage being devoted to discussing 
the predicted result. Despite a dramatic dip in the early attention paid to the forecast in 
1979, high-profile seat projections became a staple of election night broadcasts thereafter, 
with around 20 of the first 60 minutes of the broadcasts devoted to them in 1987, 1992 and 
1997. There was a slight dip in the attention paid to the exit polls in 2001 and 2005, when 
only about 15 minutes of the broadcasts focussed on the initial forecast. However, 
discussion of exit polls dominated the opening 60 minutes of BBC election night broadcasts 
in 2010, 2015 and 2017. In these broadcasts, between a half and two-thirds of all discussion 
in the first hour focussed on the seat forecasts (derived from the exit poll) and their 
implications. Despite the notable fluctuations, which we discuss further below in relation to 
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hypothesis 4, there has been a tenfold increase from 1979 to 2017 in the attention to seat 
forecasts (and their consequences) in the first hour of election night broadcasts. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
 
Two other measures of the extent to which the first hour of election night broadcasts have 
become dominated by the discussion of exit polls are shown in Table 1, below. The second 
column of the table documents the maximum amount of time which passes in election night 
broadcasts from 1992 to 2017 without the phrase ‘exit poll’ being uttered. The third column 
simply provides a count of the number of times ‘exit poll’ is used. It is not possible to 
present data for earlier elections because seat forecasts produced from 1974-1987 were not 
described as ‘exit polls’ and diverse set of terms was used to refer to them. Again, the table 
underlines that discussion of exit polls has become more intensive over time and, 
particularly, in the three election night broadcasts from 2010-17. In 2015, viewers of the 
BBC’s coverage from 10 to 11pm would have heard 88 references to the exit poll, and it was 
not until 10.47pm, when coverage switched to the first declaration from Houghton and 
Sunderland South, that more than three minutes passed without direct reference being 
made to it. By contrast, viewers in 2001 were spared any discussion of the exit poll from 
10:45 to 11.00pm, with the result from Sunderland South prompting a prolonged discussion 
of the 48% turnout rather than what the 64% Labour vote share implied about the prospect, 
or otherwise, of another Labour landslide. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
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The frontloading of election broadcasts with discussion of projections/exit polls has also 
occurred alongside an equally clear, and closely related, shift. Figure 2 shows the extent to 
which senior politicians were engaged in the first hour of election night broadcasts from 
1955 to 2017. Prior to 1983, politicians rarely appeared in the first hour of a BBC election 
night broadcast. As the figure shows, the proportion of the words spoken by politicians in 
the first hour of the BBC broadcasts had never risen above 5% from 1955-1979. The peak, 
such as it was, had been in 1964, the only instance where the early part of the broadcast has 
ever included brief interviews with both of the two main party leaders. In 1979, the only 
politician who spoke in the first hour of the broadcast was Margaret Thatcher, pursued by 
journalists on the way to her count in Finchley.  
 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
 
However, in 1983, there was a shift change. It became a standard feature for senior 
politicians to be asked to react to the projection/exit poll early in the programme. Politicians 
were asked to respond to an initial seat projection immediately after polls closed, with a 
rotating cast of senior political figures appearing in the studio or via outside broadcasts 
throughout the night. Since 1983, this format has been retained, with the proportion of 
words in the first hour spoken by senior politicians never falling back into single figures.1 
The hook for these interviews has, of course, been the seat projection or exit poll. An 
                                                     
1 The 1983 broadcast was also something of a watershed for academic engagement. Whereas a fifth of the 
content in the first hour of the 1979 broadcast was supplied by academics, this fell to zero in 1983. Both David 
Butler and Bob MacKenzie retired from their roles after featuring centrally in every broadcast from 1955 to 
1979. While Tony King joined the 1983 broadcast, providing expert analysis, he did not appear during the first 
hour of the broadcast. Instead, BBC presenter, Peter Snow, took centre stage in presenting forecasts and 
results, using computer graphics that had been unavailable at previous elections. 
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established format for questions to senior politicians, first used by BBC interviewers in 1983, 
has been present in every subsequent election night broadcast. In an opening question, the 
politician is asked for their reaction to the exit poll, which generally elicits a cautious, 
sceptical, or sometimes hostile, response. After a brief exchange, the interviewer then shifts 
to ask them for their reflections on the campaign or, in instances where a party appears to 
have performed less well than expected, about the future of its leader. To illustrate, the 
following exchange took place between Robin Day and Lord Young, Secretary of State for 
Employment, early in the 1987 broadcast: 
 
Robin Day: Lord Young, do you have the smell of defeat in your nostrils? 
 
Lord Young: Good Lord, no. It is after all, of the two, of the three polls, we've had 
during this election campaign, this shows us at the lowest point. Yet, I find that 
slightly odd. But the night's young and we shall see: 86, I think, would be a very 
satisfactory result for us; minus 17, the other way, obviously wouldn't, but let's see 
what happens. 
 
Robin Day: David Dimbleby said Mrs. Thatcher's future might be in doubt if the 
majority was, as predicted, only 26. Do you think that it's so? 
 
Lord Young: Oh nonsense. No. In ‘51 we won the sixteen majority and carried on for 
a full parliament. In ‘74, Labour won with four and carried on for full parliament, and 
I quite know one thing that Margaret Thatcher will carry on and put the policies 
through with any majority we get. 
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There is a clear association between the foregrounding of exit polls on election night and 
the greatly increased presence of politicians in the early parts of broadcasts. Figure 3 plots 
the relationship between these two variables for all election night broadcasts from 1955-
2017. While there are several notable outliers, the overall relationship is reasonably strong 
and is statistically significant (r=0.64, significant at the 0.01 level). Just as importantly, the 
plot reveals a number of distinct clusters. The first hour of all election broadcasts from 
1955-1966 contained minimal discussion of projected outcomes and were characterised by 
the virtual absence of politicians. From 1970-1974, broadcasts paid far more attention to 
projections, but continued to largely exclude politicians during the early parts of the 
programme. After the 1983 broadcast again foregrounded seat projections much more 
prominently, each of the three election broadcasts from 1987-1997, as well as the 2005 
programme, devoted around 20 minutes of the first hour to projections/exit polls, with 
senior politicians occupying 13-19% of the airtime. Finally, there is a further decisive shift in 
from 2010. The three election broadcasts from 2010-17 were all dominated in their early 
stages by exit poll considerations, while retaining a level of input from senior politicians at 
18-20% of the initial hour.  
 
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE. 
 
There is also clear evidence in the transcripts to support our second hypothesis, that exit 
polls which predict a close result will generate speculation early in the broadcast about 
potential cross-party governing arrangements. Table 2 lists four key terms that are typically 
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used in discussions of governing arrangements in the absence of a single-party majority: 
“hung parliament”, “coalition”, “minority government” and “deal”. (Instances of the use of 
“deal” refer exclusively to discussion of deals between political parties). Since seat 
projections based on on-the-day-polls were first used in October 1974, they have predicted 
a close outcome, defined here as a majority of 30 or below, on six occasions: 1979, 1987, 
1992, 2010, 2015 and 2017. Table 2 shows that it was overwhelmingly in these years that, 
during the first hour of the election broadcasts, the possibility was raised of a hung 
parliament or minority government requiring a possible coalition or deal between political 
parties. For example, the use of “hung parliament” is only found in the initial 60 minutes of 
seven broadcasts. These include all six elections where projections predicted tight 
outcomes, as well as 2005, when Labour’s majority was down very substantially from 1997 
and 2001 and correctly projected at 66 (it should be noted, however, that “hung 
parliament” was very rarely used in any British political debate before the late 1970s). 
“Coalition” also only appears in the transcripts for the same set of elections, with the 
exception of 1979 – although its use in 2015 and 2017 is inflated by retrospective references 
to the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition from 2010-15. “Minority government” is less 
frequently used, with October 1974, 1987 and 2010 being the only instances where the 
term is used. Tellingly, none of the election broadcasts from 1955 to February 1974 include 
any of the four terms within the first hour. Although the 1964 election produced a tiny 
Labour majority and the February 1974 election resulted in no overall majority for any party, 
these possibilities were not flagged early in the broadcasts, due to the absence of exit polls 
or comprehensive seat projections. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
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Importantly, the transcripts also show that the effect of exit polls in close contests can go 
beyond generating discussion of possible governing arrangements. Television coverage of 
the exit poll can provide an opportunity for party representatives to make overtures, or set 
out expectations, to potential partners. This dynamic was clearly evident during the first 
hour of the 2010 broadcast when senior Labour figures were asked if they could govern with 
the Liberal Democrats. In each case, they stressed the two parties’ areas of common cause, 
particularly with respect to electoral reform. Harriet Harman’s view, expressed a matter of 
minutes after the exit poll was released, was that “We need to follow the constitutional 
conventions to get that strong and stable government to take us through the recession, but 
I think it's been clear that there is a general feeling that we need to change the voting 
system”. The same sentiments about how Labour could find common ground with the 
Liberal Democrats on electoral reform were expressed in 2010 by Peter Mandelson and Alan 
Johnson in response to the exit poll and before a single constituency result had been 
declared. In a similar way, in 2017, a representative of the DUP was more than ready to set 
out his party’s stall for a possible arrangement with the Conservatives, on live television, in 
response to the exit poll:  
 
I’m not going to pre-empt the outcome, but what I will say is we will be serious 
players if there is a hung Parliament. We will go in and we will talk to whoever, it 
looks like that is the Conservatives, will be the largest party. We will talk to them (…) 
I think there is a lot of common ground on which we can work. Obviously, we will 
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want to get the best deal for Northern Ireland itself (Geoffrey Donaldson, DUP, on 
what the party’s negotiating stance would be in a hung parliament). 
 
No such process of pitching for coalition partners, or for possible deals with the likely largest 
party, was evident in the broadcasts from the 1964 or February 1974 elections, both of 
which produced very tight outcomes. The structure of these programmes was such that no 
forecast of a close contest was made early on and politicians did not feature until much 
later in the broadcast. Conversely, in 1987 and 1992, when initial BBC projections gave a 
misleading impression of the possible outcome, ultimately pointless discussions opened up 
about the options for Labour forming a government with the support of the Alliance/Liberal 
Democrats. Without the projected result pointing to such a potential outcome, such 
discussions clearly would not have commenced on live television.  
 
There is very mixed evidence in relation to our third hypothesis that exit polls that predict a 
surprising or close result will generate more conditional analysis than ones that confirm a 
widely expected and/or clear outcome. Figure 4 shows the number of uses of ‘if’ in the 
transcript for the first hour of each election broadcast. There is a clear increase over time in 
the use of such conditional statements. Moreover, exit polls which suggested close 
outcomes in 2010, 2015 and 2017 were all associated with a higher usage of “if” in the first 
hour of the programme. However, it also appears that exit polls that predict landslides can 
be associated with widespread caution among those responding to the forecast, as is 
evident in 1997.  
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FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE. 
 
Figure 5 provides further evidence to suggest that is no clear link between the closeness of 
the predicted result and the use of conditional statements in relation to the projection. This 
figure lists the five words most frequently used in conjunction with ‘exit poll’ (and it’s pre-
1992 equivalents) in the first hour of each BBC election night broadcast from 1970 to 2017. 
In every broadcast from 1997 onwards, the word “if’ was consistently used more frequently 
than any other in relation to the “exit poll”. Although this tendency is arguably stronger in 
2010, 2015 and 2017, when exit polls suggested tight outcomes, the tendency to err on the 
side of caution is also apparent in 1997, 2001 and 2005, when comfortable Labour 
majorities were projected. Indeed, the more evident contrast is between the consistent 
conditionality used to discuss exit polls in the 1997-2017 broadcasts and the relative 
absence of “if” statements used to discuss projections in the 1970-1992 programmes. The 
inaccuracy of the 1992 exit poll projection would provide a potential explanation for the 
more conditional treatment of exit polls in subsequent broadcasts. As such, our findings in 
relation to our third hypothesis may actually provide evidence with respect to our fourth 
hypothesis, Payne’s law, discussed in more detail below. 
 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE. 
While conditional statements about exit polls pepper the transcripts of election broadcasts 
since 1997, they do not always imply caution or reservation. For example, conditional 
statements about exit polls do not preclude senior politicians from making bold claims, 
which they sometimes later regret. In 2015, Liberal Democrat Peer, Paddy Ashdown told 
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BBC presenter, Andrew Neil, “If this exit poll is right (….) I will publicly eat my hat on your 
programme”. In a slightly different vein, a relatively common technique among politicians is 
to express initial caution or scepticism about the exit poll, and stress the need to wait for 
the results, but to anyway proceed to make confident statements about what the exit poll 
shows. For example, speaking to presenter Jeremy Vine in 2015, Michael Gove, a senior 
Conservative cabinet minister said: 
 
Well first of all, Jeremy, I think it's an unwise politician who doesn't treat exit polls 
with a certain degree of caution (…) If it is if it is correct I think what it does show is a 
clear rejection of Gordon Brown and I think it shows that Labour would have lost 
their legitimacy to govern because if those are the results are correct they will have 
had the worst result since 1931 (…) It would be an unprecedented vote of 
confidence in David Cameron's leadership. 
 
As noted above, a clear tendency since 1983 has been for interviewers to use seat 
projections to pose hypothetical questions about whether a party leader should resign or if 
will face a leadership challenge. While such questions are generally framed as being 
conditional on the accuracy of the exit poll, they can also place immediate pressure on a 
party leader long before the result of the election is known. For example, in 2015, Labour’s 
Harriet Harman was asked about the future of Ed Miliband as party leader, “if the exit poll 
turns out to be right”, just minutes after the poll had been released. Conversely, in instances 
where the exit poll confirms what was widely expected, questions about the future of party 
leaders have been framed with no conditional element whatsoever. In 1983, Roy Hattersley 
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was asked whether for Labour “it might have been a different story with a different 
leadership?” on the basis of a projection alone. Similarly, the outcome of the 1997 General 
Election was essentially assumed, on the basis of the exit poll, when Jeremy Paxman asked 
the Conservatives’ Michael Portillo, “Do you think that on the basis of this likely outcome 
John Major could continue as leader?”.  
Finally, there is sufficient evidence in our data to support Payne’s law of exit polling that ‘a 
bad forecast is remembered forever, good ones are soon forgotten’. However, there are 
also grounds to suggest that good forecasts are remembered too, particularly if produced in 
the context of a tight election. The first support for Payne’s law is provided in Figure 1 and 
helps to explain some of the fluctuation. The most wayward pre-results forecasts were 
made in October 1974, 1987 and 1992. In each case, the error in the prediction of the 
winning party’s seat total was above 10%. The significantly lower profile given to the 
forecast in 1979 is almost certainly a product of the failure of the October 1974 forecast, 
which overestimated, by 132, the size of the Labour majority (rather than the 135-seat 
majority projected for Labour, there was a Labour majority of just three). It is also likely that 
the shortcomings of the 1987 and 1992 forecasts prompted a reluctance to give greater 
prominence to the exit polls conducted from 1997 to 2005.  
 
However, the chart also suggests that successful projections or exit polls at preceding 
elections were associated with editorial decisions to give greater weight to them in 
subsequent coverage. Although presented in a cautious manner, the ‘straw polls’ conducted 
in 1970 and February 1974 proved highly accurate in predicting not only the results in the 
constituencies in question, but also the outcome of the election nationally. The decision to 
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lead with a full seat projection in the October 1974 broadcast was in part informed by this 
success (Brown and Payne, 1975). Similarly, the 1983 projection remains one of the most 
accurate of all time and was followed by a substantial increase in the discussion of the 
projection in 1987. After 1992, exit polls become increasingly accurate. Both the 1997 and 
2001 exit polls correctly predicted Labour landslides, albeit with relatively high errors in the 
projected vote shares. The 2005 exit poll predicted Labour’s parliamentary representation 
to within 0.3%. This performance undoubtedly bolstered confidence to lead the 2010 
broadcast with a substantial focus on the exit poll. The remarkable accuracy of the 2010 exit 
poll, and the subsequent success of the 2015 and 2017 exit polls, have been associated with 
a growing focus on them in the early part of the broadcasts.  
 
Further evidence for Payne’s law is provided by the references made in broadcasts to 
previous projections or exit polls. Politicians asked for their response to an exit poll will 
generally express caution, and sometime cynicism, often with reference to the failures of 
past polls. The 1992 exit poll has evidently become the ‘go to’ example in such instances and 
is cited more frequently than any other past projection. Direct references to the 1992 exit 
poll are rare in the 1997 and 2001 broadcasts (a likely consequence of the widespread 
expectation of a Labour landslide in both instances). However, the spectre of 1992 is raised 
on several occasions in the first hour of both the 2005 and 2010 broadcasts, underlining 
how long that exit poll has lived in the political memory. In 2005, Professor Tony King 
reminded viewers with respect to the exit poll that “famously in 1992 it was completely 
wrong”, while Liberal Democrat MP, Menzies Campbell, said that “all politicians should have 
1992 engraved on the heart, because of course the exit polls proved to be wrong”. Liberal 
Democrat MPs were also keen to point to the experience of 1992 when they were asked 
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about the exit poll in 2010, with Danny Alexander referencing the 1992 exit poll as evidence 
that they are “notoriously unreliable” and Ed Davey expressing scepticism about the “BBC's, 
record on exit polls” on the grounds that “in 1992 you were over 60 seats out”. Aside from 
1992, only the 1987 projection was cited more than once across all the transcripts as 
grounds for scepticism towards exit polls. Moreover, on the second of the two occasions on 
which 1987 was invoked, it was bracketed with 1992: “Both in 1987 and in 1992 we were 
served up exit polls which predicted Labour governments and, in the event, there was a 
Conservative government” (Stephen Dorall, Conservative MP, 1997). 
 
However, there are also grounds to suggest that good forecasts are not necessarily soon 
forgotten and can help displace the memory of less accurate ones. In the 2015 election 
night broadcast, multiple references are made to the accuracy of the 2010 exit poll, and 
none at all to the inaccuracy of its 1992 equivalent. Notably, not a single one of these 
reminders of the success of the 2010 exit poll was provided by a politician. Instead, they 
came from a combination of BBC presenters and independent pollsters, most memorably 
from lead presenter, David Dimbleby who introduced Professor John Curtice as “the 
architect, the king of exit polls (….) the person who has done all the sophisticated work that 
worked in 2010”. We therefore suggest that Payne’s law should be supplemented with a 
second law of exit polling, namely that “The sustained success of exit polls will increase 
confidence about their accuracy and result in less scepticism being expressed about them”. 
We admit that this formulation is rather less snappy than his original.  
 
Conclusion  
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Election night broadcasts present a unique challenge for presenters, politicians, pundits and 
psephologists alike. In distinctive ways, all of these election night participants are required 
to offer their interpretations of rapidly evolving events, basing their assessments on partial 
and imperfect information. This experience is just as much atypical for politicians, whose 
engagements with the media otherwise tend to be far more scripted, as it is for 
psephologists, who would generally want to undertake considered, and lengthy, analysis of 
the available data before seeking to draw conclusions about an election outcome.  
Nonetheless, it is evident from our analysis that academic innovations in election 
forecasting have helped shape election night programming in the UK. Further research 
could potentially build on these findings by examining the nature of the relationship 
between the exit poll team and the broadcasters over time. One such avenue for inquiry 
could be the role that broadcasters have played in developing psephological methods and 
capacity, for instance by providing computing power generally unavailable to academics in 
the 1950s or 1960s, or simply through the act of bringing together the leading figures in the 
study of UK elections with a major polling agency to undertake the exit poll. We would also 
suggest that there is considerable scope for comparative international research to examine 
how exit polling has developed in the context of different electoral systems and contrasting 
broadcasting environments.  
 
Clearly, the tendencies we observe at more recent UK elections for both exit poll projections 
and politicians to become more central to the first hour of BBC broadcasts are unlikely to be 
products of developments in exit polling alone. The general elections of 2010 and 2015 had 
long been anticipated to be close and pre-election polls in 2017 indicated that the race was 
tightening. In such contexts, it seems plausible that election night broadcasts would give 
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greater weight to exit poll projections and to their potential consequences, if proved 
correct. At the same time, our initial analysis of an uncorrected transcript for the BBC’s 2019 
election night broadcast suggests that it did not depart significantly from the patterns we 
identified for proceeding elections. In 2019, the exit poll confirmed pre-election 
expectations of a Conservative majority. Yet, the longest period in the first hour of the 
broadcast in which the phrase ‘exit poll’ is not used is 6 minutes 30 seconds. In addition, 17 
of the first 60 minutes are taken up with interviews with politicians, in which the exit poll 
provides the basis for discussion of the implications of the election outcome. Unlike 2015 or 
2017, the 2019 exit poll did not force broadcasters to rip up anticipated scripts and provided 
less scope for fresh, competing narratives to emerge. Nonetheless, it again demonstrated 
the powerful role of election night broadcasts in establishing an initial interpretation of the 
election result, for instance with respect to the reasons for Labour’s heavy defeat and the 
loss of its ‘red wall’ seats in former industrial towns.  
 
Finally, our analysis of election night transcripts should also provide some comfort for 
academics. Rather than simply confirming the harsh realities of Payne’s (1992) law of 
election forecasting, we find some counter evidence to suggest the memory of good 
forecasts does live on and bad ones eventually forgotten. Indeed, based on the cumulative 
record of exit polls since 2005, and the subsequent references to them, there are strong 
grounds to suppose that a previous run of good forecasts can be uppermost in the minds of 
those invited to react to an exit polls in the early hours of election night. After the 
experiences of 2010 and 2015, senior politicians seem less likely to promise to eat their hats 
if the exit poll proves correct.  
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Figure 1: % of first hour of BBC election results programme spent discussing the projected 
result/exit poll and its potential/likely consequences, 1955-2017.  
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Figure 2: % of words in first hour spoken by senior politicians in interviews with BBC 
presenters/reporters, 1955-2017. 
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Figure 3: Relationship between % of first hour spent discussing exit polls and % of words 
spoken in first hour by politicians, BBC election broadcasts, 1955-2017 (r=0.64; p<0.01). 
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Figure 4: Number of uses of "if" in first hour of election night broadcasts, 1955-2017. 
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Figure 5: Frequencies of top five words when discussing exit polls, 1970-2017. 
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Table 1: Longest stretch of time in first hour during which the term 'exit poll' is not used and 
total references to ‘exit poll’, BBC election night broadcasts, 1992-2017. 
 
Election Max. time with no 
use of ‘exit poll’ 
(mins: secs) 
Total references to 
‘exit poll’ in the first 
hour 
1992 10:24 37 
1997 07:55 49 
2001 14:44 36 
2005 09:44 37 
2010 05:40 78 
2015 03:48 88 
2017 04:54 76 
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Table 2: Frequency of terms relating to arrangements other than single-party majority 
governments in the first hour of BBC election broadcasts, 1955-2017. 
 
Projected 
majority 
(party and 
size)  
Actual 
majority 
(party and 
size) 
Mentions of 
"Hung 
parliament" 
Mentions of 
"coalition" 
Mentions of 
"minority 
government
" 
Mentions of 
"deal"* 
1955 – Feb 1974 
(6 elections) 
n/a n/a 0 0 0 0 
Oct 1974 Lab, 135 Lab, 3 0 0 5 0 
1979 Cons, 14 Cons, 43 1 0 0 0 
1983 Cons, 146 Cons, 144 0 0 0 0 
1987 Cons, 26 Cons, 102 6 1 1 0 
1992 Cons, -49 Cons, 21 14 2 0 2 
1997 Lab, 185 Lab, 179 0 0 0 0 
2001 Lab, 157 Lab, 167 0 0 0 0 
2005 Lab, 66 Lab, 66 1 2 0 0 
2010 Cons, -19 Cons, -19 14 3 3 12 
2015 Cons, -10 Cons, 12 1 16 0 4 
2017 Cons, -12 Cons, -8 2 10 0 4 
 
*Only instances where “deal” is used specifically to refer to an agreement or arrangement 
between political parties are included. 
